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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court denied Heather Rochelle Cox’s motion to suppress evidence found
following a traffic stop of the car she was driving. However, the dash camera footage from the
arresting officer showed that Ms. Cox’s car stopped before crossing a sidewalk to enter a
roadway, meaning the officers did not have the claimed justification that the car did not come to
a complete stop.

After the denial of the motion, a jury found Ms. Cox guilty of felony

possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On appeal,
Ms. Cox asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress, because the
court’s factual finding that her car did not come to a complete stop was clearly erroneous.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Mauri of the Coeur d’Alene Police Department conducted a traffic stop on a
yellow Mustang driven by Ms. Cox, after the officer reportedly saw the Mustang and another
vehicle, a Dodge Nitro, leave the parking lot of the Lighthouse Motel without coming to a
complete stop. (See R., p.16.) However, Officer Mauri admitted at the motion to suppress
hearing that his dash camera footage from that night showed the Nitro coming to a complete
stop. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.15, L.2 – p.19, L.9; State’s Ex. 2 (dash camera footage).) He testified,
“At the time of the encounter, it was clear to me the Dodge Nitro did not stop; however, upon
reviewing the video, I’m confident the Dodge Nitro did stop.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.19, Ls.14-23.) The
officer testified that, after reviewing the dash camera footage, he still felt that the Mustang did
not stop all the way before entering the roadway. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.6.)
Officer Boardman testified that he was in the area of the Lighthouse Motel that night, and
he stopped the Dodge Nitro. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.29, Ls.16-22.) He testified he had a good view of
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the entrance and exit of the motel, and he “watched two vehicles exit the Lighthouse parking lot
in reverse, back onto Sherman, and proceed west on Sherman.” (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.30, Ls.11-24.)
Officer Boardman also testified that he had reviewed Officer Mauri’s dash camera footage, and
while he had believed the Nitro “had failed to come to a complete stop before backing onto
Sherman and proceeding westbound,” the “video evidence certainly seems that he made a far
more conceded effort to stop before proceeding onto Sherman.” (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.31, Ls.5-21.)
He testified the footage did not change his belief as to the Mustang. (Tr. 3/6/19, p.31, Ls.22-24.)
During the traffic stop, Ms. Cox told Officer Mauri that she was high on marijuana. (See
R., p.16.) Officer Boardman arrived on scene and searched the car, finding paraphernalia, and
Officer Mauri arrested Ms. Cox. (See R., pp.16-17.) Officer Mauri found a glass pipe and a
plastic bag containing suspected methamphetamine on her person. (See R., p.17.) The suspected
methamphetamine later tested positive for methamphetamine. (See Ex. 6.)
The State charged Ms. Cox by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance, and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.68-69.) She pleaded not guilty
to the charges. (R., p.74) Ms. Cox filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order “suppressing
any and all evidence gathered against” her, “including all statements made by” her, “the
observations made by the officers of” her “during and after the stop, and any evidence seized
subsequent to the stop.” (R., pp.72-73.) She asserted, “The evidence must be suppressed
because the warrantless stop and arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal
justification, therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the [C]onstitution of the United
States and Article I § 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.” (R., p.72.)
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Ms. Cox’s Memorandum in Aid of Motion to Suppress asserted, “The only issue in this
case is whether Ms. Cox stopped prior to the sidewalk as required by I.C. § 49-651.”1
(R., pp.78-79.) She explained that, “To stop is defined by I.C. § 49-120(25) as ‘the act of or
complete cessation from movement,’” and “[s]topping is defined as ‘the act of halting even
momentarily of a vehicle.’ I.C. § 49-120(26).” (R., p.78.) She further stated, “In State v. Neal,
159 Idaho 439, 445-447 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court outlined the basic [tenets] of statutory
construction and found that the line painted along the roadway had no legal existence.”
(R., p.78.) Ms. Cox asserted: “Applying those rules to I.C. § 49-651, this Court should find a
momentary halt of Ms. Cox’s vehicle is all that was required. The evidence will show that she
halted, even if only for a moment.” (R., p.78.) The State argued in opposition that Ms. Cox’s
vehicle had not come to a complete stop before entering the roadway. (See R., pp.80-83.)
Officer Mauri testified that he was on routine patrol on the night of the incident, when
Officer Boardman told him that a car at the Lighthouse Motel was associated with a drug house.
(See Tr. 3/6/19, p.9, L.11 – p.12, L.2.) He testified the Lighthouse Motel was a hot spot for drug
sales at the time.

(Tr. 3/6/19, p.12, Ls.2-5.)

He parked his patrol car where he had an

unobstructed view of the Lighthouse Motel’s exit. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.9, L.14 – p.10, L.3, p.13,
Ls.12.) People accessed the Lighthouse Motel from Sherman Avenue, and a sidewalk separated
the motel property from the roadway. (Tr. 3/6/19, p.13, Ls.18-23.)

1

Section 49-651 provides:
The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway
within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to
driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley,
building entrance, or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop
at the point nearest the highway to be entered where the driver has a view of
approaching traffic.
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According to Officer Mauri, as he was watching the motel: “I observed first a silver
Dodge Nitro backing up from the parking lot of the Lighthouse Motel onto Sherman Avenue. I
then observed immediately after a yellow Mustang backing up from the parking lot onto
Sherman Avenue turning westbound onto Sherman Avenue.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.14, Ls.3-11.)
Officer Mauri testified: “I put my vehicle in motion because the first violation I saw was
[Ms. Cox] not stop prior to the sidewalk . . . . It was after I started driving that I observed her not
stop at all prior to the roadway.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.22, Ls.3-9.) He testified, “she specifically did
not stop prior to the sidewalk or prior to entering the roadway.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.22, Ls.14-20.)
Ms. Cox’s counsel asserted, based on his review of the dash camera footage, that “it
seemed like a stop had occurred, at least what would be required by the law.” (See Tr. 3/6/19,
p.36, Ls.18-23.) The State argued that the dash camera footage and the officers’ testimony
showed the Mustang did not stop. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.37, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Cox asserted in reply
that “the needs of what the law is trying to do here are being met,” even if the momentary
hesitation before the Mustang entered the roadway was not a complete stop, and the traffic stop
was not reasonable. (Tr. 3/6/19, p.38, L.18 – p.40, L.22; see Tr. 3/6/19, p.37, Ls.12-16.)
The district court noted, “there must be a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a
traffic violation has occurred in order to justify law enforcement stopping the defendant, in this
particular matter, of driving that yellow Mustang.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.41, Ls.13-17.) The court then
discussed section 49-651, and observed, “So the pertinent language here is that a driver must
stop the vehicle immediately before it drives onto the sidewalk that separates a parking lot from a
public street or roadway.” (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.41, L.24 – p.42, L.17.) Based on the statutory
definitions of “stop” and “stopping,” the district court stated: “You can be stopping but never
come to the complete cessation, you never complete that stopping. But the language of the
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statute in question here calls for the vehicle to stop, which means the act of or complete cessation
from movement.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.43, Ls.19-23; see Tr. 3/6/19, p.42, L.18 – p.43, L.15.)
The district court then determined: “The Court is not just relying on its own observations
of the video. It is relying on the testimony of Officer Mauri and Officer Boardman.” (Tr. 3/6/19
p.43, L.24 – p.44, L.1.) Per the court, both officers “from their vantage points on the night in
question . . . believed and reported that the yellow Mustang that was being driven by Ms. Cox
that was ultimately stopped by Officer Mauri, did not stop prior to crossing the sidewalk before
backing onto Sherman Avenue to . . . proceed westbound.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, Ls.1-7.) While the
officers “both apparently mistakenly believed that the . . . Dodge Nitro, likewise did not stop,”
Officer Mauri’s dash camera footage showed that the Nitro did stop before crossing the sidewalk
and then proceeding onto Sherman. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, Ls.8-14.)
However, “the Court’s observation of the dash cam is that the yellow Mustang did not
come to a complete cessation of movement.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, Ls.14-17.) The district court
observed that the car “carefully and slowly crossed the sidewalk onto Sherman. But that’s not
the language of the statute being that one carefully or slowly or with due caution proceeds onto
the street.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, Ls.18-22.)
The district court was satisfied “that both of these officers were intending to find a reason
to stop either the Nitro and/or the Mustang. Certainly the Mustang, possibly the Nitro as well.
They were looking for a reason to stop it.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, L.24 – p.45, L.4.) The court
determined: “And this is a pretext stop for the purpose of engaging in an investigation of
possible drug activity. But it’s a legitimate pretext stop.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.45, Ls.4-6.) Thus, the
district court determined “that the defendant did not obey the traffic laws by stopping before
backing onto Sherman, and therefore a traffic violation occurred in the presence of these officers
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and there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop that vehicle.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.45,
Ls.7-12.)
The district court did not find any “bad faith in the fact that the officers reported and
maybe even testified under oath that the Nitro stopped, but that’s not the issue before the Court
whether the Nitro in fact stopped or not.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.45, Ls.13-17.) The court stated, “It has
some bearing on the Court’s determination of the credibility of the officers’ testimony,” but the
court thought “the officers were expecting and hoping to see these vehicle[s] engage in a traffic
violation so they could stop them, and simply I think were wrong about the Nitro.” (Tr. 3/6/19,
p.45, Ls.17-24.) The district court nonetheless determined the officers “were right about the
Mustang.” (Tr. 3/6/19, p.45, Ls.24-25.)
Additionally, the district court did not adopt Ms. Cox’s assertion that her conduct was
“[c]lose enough for reasonableness,” because the issue “is more whether the determination by the
police . . . that a traffic violation had occurred was a reasonable determination, and the Court
finds that it was under this evidence.” (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.46, Ls.1-8.) The district court therefore
denied Ms. Cox’s motion to suppress. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.46, Ls.9-14.)
Ms. Cox ultimately exercised her right to a jury trial. (See R., pp.133-45.) At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Ms. Cox guilty of both charges. (R., p.147.) On the
possession of a controlled substance charge, the district court withheld judgment and placed
Ms. Cox on supervised probation for a period of two years. (R., pp.207-13, 215-21.) Ms. Cox
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Order Withholding Judgment.2 (R., pp.222-26.)
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The district court later found that Ms. Cox had violated her probation, set aside the withheld
judgment, imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and continued her on
probation. (Judgment on Probation Violation, 2/10/20.)
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cox’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Cox’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Cox asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress, because

the court’s factual finding that her Mustang did not come to a complete stop was clearly
erroneous. Officer Mauri’s dash camera footage shows the Mustang coming to a stop before
entering the roadway. Further, the officers’ admission that the Nitro made a complete stop,
despite their previous reports that it did not, undermines the district court’s determination that the
officers were credible. Additionally, the district court determined that the traffic stop was a
pretext stop, and the officers were looking for a reason to stop the Mustang. Thus, the district
court’s factual finding that Ms. Cox’s Mustang did not come to a complete stop was
clearly erroneous.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will

defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655, 658 (2007). “Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
and competent evidence.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). “Substantial, competent
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 379, 381 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.” Bishop, 146
Idaho at 810. “However, free review is exercised over a trial court’s determination as to whether
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constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.” Henage, 143 Idaho
at 658.

C.

The District Court’s Factual Finding That Ms. Cox’s Mustang Did Not Come To A
Complete Stop Is Clearly Erroneous
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.3 “This guarantee has been incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 810 (2009) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). “Evidence obtained in
violation of the amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action.” Id. at 810-11. “When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the
grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the
burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.” Id. at 811.
“Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012).

“The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness

requirement has been held to apply to brief investigatory detentions.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). “To determine whether such seizures are reasonable, courts first
ask ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
19-20).

“Next, they consider whether the action ‘was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 19-20).

3

Ms. Cox does not raise a separate assertion pursuant to Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
9

“[L]imited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime.” Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). “Reasonable
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those facts.” Id. “The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a
traffic stop is a seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so
long as there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.”
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016).
The relevant statute in this case, I.C. § 49-651, provides:
The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway
within a business or residential district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to
driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley,
building entrance, or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop
at the point nearest the highway to be entered where the driver has a view of
approaching traffic.
The statutory definition of “stop” is “the act of or complete cessation from movement.”
I.C. § 49-120(25).

“Stopping” is “the act of any halting even momentarily of the vehicle.

I.C. § 49-120(26). The district court in this case determined, “the Court’s observation of the
dash cam is that the yellow Mustang did not come to a complete cessation of movement.”
(Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, Ls.14-17.) Per the district court, Ms. Cox “did not obey the traffic laws by
stopping before backing onto Sherman, and therefore a traffic violation occurred in the presence
of these officers and there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop that vehicle.”
(Tr. 3/6/19, p.45, Ls.7-12.)
Here, while the standard for showing clear error is high, the district court’s factual
finding that Ms. Cox’s Mustang did not come to a complete stop was clearly erroneous. Officer
Mauri’s dash camera footage shows the Mustang coming to a stop before entering the roadway.
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(See Ex. 2, 00:36-00.45.) Further, the officers’ admission that the Nitro made a complete stop,
despite their previous reports that it did not, undermines the district court’s determination that the
officers were credible. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.19, Ls.14-23, p.31, Ls.5-21.) Additionally, the district
court determined that the traffic stop was a pretext stop, and the officers were looking for a
reason to stop the Mustang. (See Tr. 3/6/19, p.44, L.24 – p.45, L.6.) Thus, substantial and
competent evidence did not support the district court’s factual finding. See Moore, 164 Idaho at
381; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. The district court’s factual finding that Ms. Cox’s Mustang did
not come to a complete stop was clearly erroneous.
Because Ms. Cox’s Mustang actually came to a stop before entering the roadway, the
traffic stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred. See
Linze, 161 Idaho at 609; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. The district court therefore erred when it
denied Ms. Cox’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Cox respectfully requests that this Court vacate her order
withholding judgment (and subsequent judgment on probation violation), vacate the district
court’s motion denying the motion to suppress, and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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